The End Does Not Justify the Means; Violation of Human Rights in Xin Jiang

The Chinese official media claims that two Uighur (a Muslim ethnic group in Xin Jiang) men drove a dump truck into a group of jogging policemen on Monday August 4, killing 16 police officers, Such an act of terrorism, coming four days ahead the opening of the Beijing Olympics, is clearly an attempt by the dissidents to highlight their cause of separatism, as the Chinese government claims, or saving their cultural identity as the Uighurs claim. Whatever the objectives of the dissidents, violence is not justifiable. Violence brings about reprisals and counter-violence leadings to mindless killings and the cause, however genuine, is lost sight of. It goes to the credit of Rebiya Kadeer, a prominent Uighur dissident who issued a statement condemning all acts of violence.

There is no doubt that the Chinese government has attempted or allowed its agencies to undermine the ethnic culture and literature and in the name of war on terrorism to violate the basic norms of human rights in Xin Jiang. This is testified not only by the US State Department’s country reports on human rights but also by prestigious independent human rights related public interest groups such as the Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch (HRW). The present blog draws heavily on the reports from these organizations to draw attention to human rights infringements in Xin Jiang.

The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, in northwest China, is a vast region, with almost one-sixth of China's land area. It is strategically important to China because it borders several countries, not all friendly to China. Xin Jiang is also expected to become the biggest petroleum and gas production base in China. Xinjiang has a population of 18 million many of whom are of Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic groups. The Uighurs, numbering eight million,
\are the largest ethnic group, the second largest group being the Kazakhs numbering 1.2 million. The ethnic Chinese (Han) accounted for only 6 percent of the population in 1949; their population, thanks to the state sponsored transfer of population, has now risen to 7.5 million accounting for 40 percent of the total population of the region.

As the Human Rights Watch (HRW), writes ‘Chinese authorities have not discriminated between peaceful and violent dissent, however, and their fight against "separatism" and "religious extremism" has been used to justify widespread and systematic human rights violations against Uighurs, including many involved in non-violent political, religious, and cultural activities.’

Many Uighurs complain of racial abuse and discrimination against ethnic minorities, and the lack of equal opportunity in education, health care and employment. Unlike their Chinese Han institutions, Uighur schools and hospitals are poorly equipped, with some Uighur village schools so poor and short of equipment that the pupils have to sit and write on the earthen floor. Many hospitals reportedly give preferential treatment to Han Chinese patients and top jobs to Chinese doctors at the expense of their Uighur counterparts.

The opportunities afforded by the economic development have benefited mainly Han Chinese. Many Uighur farmers have become so impoverished due to discriminatory policies, the multiplication of taxes, and corruption that they have to sell their crops to state agencies at lower prices than those of the free market, whereas Chinese farmers are reportedly allowed to trade on the market. Many Uighur farmers are forced by circumstances to sell their land and joined the ranks of the unemployed and vagrants. Han Chinese are the major beneficiaries of the newly created job opportunities in the new oil fields and other enterprises in the north. In the south, many enterprises which have been privatized are now under Han Chinese management which prefer Han Chinese over Uighur workers. With increasing unemployment, there has been an increase in crime, drug addiction and prostitution have become widespread among the unemployed.

As a result of the "open door" policy launched in the late 1970s mosques were reopened and some Islamic countries were allowed to fund the construction of mosques and to establish Koranic schools and import religious books. In the late 1980s the restrictive policies brought back amidst fears that Islam might provide a rallying point for ethnic nationalism. It was also feared that Islamist movements abroad might inspire young Uighurs who had studied in foreign Islamic schools. These fears were apparently reinforced by the protests and rioting in Baren, near Kashgar in 1990, reportedly led by members of an Islamic nationalist group, which resulted in many deaths. New restrictive policies include closure of mosques and Koranic schools, banning of the use of the Arabic script, the tight control, including dismissal and arrests, of the Islamic clergy, and religious leaders and the prohibition on practising religion by Muslims working in government offices and other official institutions.

There has been a curtailment of social and cultural rights as well. In Urumqi, the regional capital, some Uighur entrepreneurs have bee n harassed for manufacturing traditional ethnic clothes or for being involved in social activism. Some entrepreneurs were forced to close down their businesses. In cities in the north, some people have faced harassment or even detention simply for displaying signs of their ethnic or religious identity, such as headscarves for Muslim women.


All this has resulted in an exacerbation of long-standing ethnic tensions between Uighurs and Han Chinese in the region which is behind the escalation of violence in recent years. The number of violent incidents has increased significantly. These include violent clashes between small groups of Uighurs and the security forces, attacks on government officials and bombings by underground opposition groups. The government’s response, as usual, has been harsh repression by launching a ’hard hit’ campaign against ‘ethnic separatists’, imposing new restrictions on religious and cultural rights and resorting increasingly to executions, show trials and arbitrary detention to silence real and suspected opponents.

Both the HRW and the Amnesty International points out that people not involved in violence are also victims of human rights abuses. Attempts by Uighurs to air their views or grievances peacefully and to exercise their most fundamental human rights in constitutional manner have attracted government repression. In doing so the government is inevitably inviting violence. One recognises that Xin Jiang, bordering several countries not all friendly to China, is strategically important; vast amount of petroleum and gas makes the region economically valuable as well. Therefore, its security and the maintenance of law and order are of paramount importance to the Chinese government. But the answer is not in repression which would exacerbate the cycle of violence and counter-violence. While the government must take a hard line against terrorists and violent elements, it must not alienate those who abhor violence.
As the HRW points out, there has long been strong Uighur opposition to Chinese rule in Xinjiang. The effective control of the region by the central government was achieved only after the founding of the Chinese People’s Republic in 1949. In fact, between 1944 and 1949, a short-lived independent East Turkestan Republic ruled the region. It was backed by the Soviet Union. Today, the Uighur opposition-in-exile is based in Turkey, Germany and the United States, and remains overwhelmingly pan-Turkic. The East Turkestan National Congress, based in Munich, Germany, a federation of most of the Turkish and European Uighur associations, consistently advocates peaceful means to achieve a ‘real autonomy’ or ‘independence’ for the region.
Likewise, Uighur organizations in Central Asia, such as the Kazakhstan Regional Uighur Organisation in Almaty or Kyrgyzstan Uighur Unity in Bishkek believe in democracy and secularism.
In Xinjiang itself, there is no unified movement. Pan-Turkic movements like the East Turkestan Party (Tengri Tag), and the Uighur Liberation Organization are the most structured organizations, and are active mainly in urban areas like Yining, Urumqi, Korla, and Kucha. More religiously-oriented groups are active in the southern part of Xinjiang, notably in the Kashgar and Hetian areas. Such groups advocate the establishment of an Islamic state in Xinjiang and oppose Chinese domination, but as the HRW points out there is no evidence that they are either associated with the Taliban or draw inspiration from them. As the HRW points out, the pro-independence groups, whether religious or secular, are mainly ethno-centric movements, not religious ones. There is no evidence of significant cooperation among Xinjiang's different Muslim ethnic groups of Kazakhs, Mongols, Tajiks, and Uighurs on religious lines.
The Chinese government’s’ claim, that these groups are in league with fundamentalist Islamic groups, at least at present, cannot be easily substantiated. A continuing repression may in the long-run prove to be counter-productive since it may lead to a greater cooperation among these disparate groups and then the Chinese government may find it difficult to deal with these groups. It is imperative that the Chinese government begins a meaningful dialogue with the dissidents in Xin Jaing, Tibet and other areas. If repression silenced or eliminated dissent, the Chinese Communist Party would not have come to power in the face of Chiang Kai-shek’s repressive policies.